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IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF 
ACTION UNDER THE SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933 SECTION 17(A) 
Implied rights of action are a recognized means of expanding 
access to the courts where a statute does not expressly grant a 
private cause of action.1 Courts have been willing to imply rights 
of action under federal securities laws in order to effectuate the 
legislations' remedial purpose/.! Recently, however, the Supreme 
Court has narrowed the scope of several securities regulations, 
most notably rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,8 
' See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 
HARV. L. REv. 285 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Implying Civil Remedies]. 
Courts have opened their dockets to private parties through various rationales. An 
early theory, based upon tort concepts, was that breach of a statutory duty of care estab-
lished a cause of action. See Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 
1967); Implying Civil Remedies, supra, at 286. 
A more potent theory developed from the combination of the remedial nature of a 
statute and the legal maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium - "where there is a right, there is a 
remedy". See California v. Sierra Club, 49 U.S.L.W. 4441, 4444 (U.S. April 28, 1981) 
(Nos. 79-1252 & 79-1502) (Stevens, J., concurring); notes 15-19 and accompanying text 
infra. See generally McMahon & Rodas, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of 
Action: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REv. 167 (1966); Mowe, Federal 
Statutes and Implied Private Actions, 55 OR. L. REv. 3 (1976). 
• See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § l0(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976)); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 
426 (1964) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)). See 
generally Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 n.13 (1979) (comprehen-
sive recitation of Supreme Court implication decisions based upon the first criterion of 
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 741-42 (Powell, J. dissenting) (reci-
tation of court of appeals implication decisions following Cort); ALI Fed. Securities Code 
§ 1722(a), Comment (1) (survey of federal court implication decisions in securities field). 
• Rule l0b-5 states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5. 
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the widely used antifraud provision. Private parties seeking a 
remedy for securities fraud therefore must look to provisions 
other than section lO(b) as possible replacements for the weak-
ened rule lOb-5.' One such provision is section 17(a) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933.'1 Congress included section 17(a) in the Se-
curities Act of 1933 to combat fraudulent practices in the offer 
or sale of securities.8 Section 17(a), however, does not include an 
express private remedy. 7 
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly, in recent implica-
tion cases from the securiti_es field, whether an implied private 
right of action exists under section 17(a).8 The Court's general 
trend in recent implication cases has been to construe narrowly 
the statute in question, thus denying implied causes of action.9 
Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court has neither articu-
lated a clear standard nor applied any implication test consist-
ently ,10 whether an implied right of action exists under section 
17(a) is uncertain. 
This article considers the existence of a private right of action 
under Securities Act section 17(a). Part I examines the evolving 
implication doctrines, and their applicability to section 17(a). 
• See Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule lOb-5: Implied Remedies and 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REv. 641 (1978); Comment, 17(a) 
of the 1933 Securities Act: An Alternative to the Recently Restricted' Rule lOb-5, 9 
RUT.-CAM. L. REv. 340 (1978). 
• § 17(a) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the 
use of any means or instruments of transporation or communication in interstate 
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a mate-\ 
rial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). 
• See R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH, SECURITIES REGULATION 53 (4th ed. 1977). 
7 Section 17(a) provides expressly for criminal sanctions and government-injunctive 
relief. See note 48 and accompanying text infra. 
• See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,689 (1980) (The Supreme Court "has not had occa-
sion to address the question whether a private cause of action exists under § 17(a)."); 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.6 (1975). 
• See Pillai, Negative Implication: The Demise of Private Rights of Action in the 
Federal Courts, 47 U. C1N. L. REv. 1 (1978); Note, A New Direction for Implied ·causes 
· of Action, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 505 (1980) [hereinafter cited as A New Direction]; Note, 
Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes - The Emergence of a Conservative 
Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Implied Private Ac-
tions Under Federal Statutes]. 
•• See generally A New Direction, supra note 9. 
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Part II discusses the need for a statutory solution and the treat-
ment of implied rights of action under the American Law Insti-
tute's proposed Federal Securities Code.11 
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND AN IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION 
UNDER SECTION 17(A) 
A. Implication Tests 
The Supreme Court has used several tests over the last decade 
for determining whether a private right of action should be im-
plied where a statute fails to provide one expressly. The two 
most recent tests, presented in Cort v. Ash11 and Touche Ross & 
Co. v. Redington, 18 reflect the divergent development of case law 
and statutory construction in the implication area. 
1. The Cort test- The Supreme Court unanimously approved 
a four-part implication test in Cort v. Ash14 which reconciled 
several inconsistent cases. One line of cases, stemming from the 
Warren Court era, had utilized an expansive doctrine of statu-
tory construction15 based on the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium: 
"where there is a right, there is a remedy."18 This broad con-
struction emphasized effectuating a statute's remedial purpose,17 
and resulted in the implication of a private cause of action, 
under the securities statutes, in J.I. Case v. Borak18 and Super-
11 In 1978, the ALI adopted a codification of various securities laws. At present, the 
Code appears far from adoption. Commentators disagree regarding the merits of the 
Code. Compare Lowenfels, The Case Against the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 65 
VA. L. REV. 615 (1979), with Troop, The Proposed Federal Securities Code: A Response 
to Its Critics, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1597 (1979). 
11 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
18 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
" 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (shareholder's derivative suit challenging illegal campaign 
contributions). 
'" Although statutory construction is not synonomous with statutory interpretation, 
the terms are used interchangeably by the courts. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 45.04 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973); A New Direction, supra note 9, at 508 
n.22. The choice of a maxim of statutory construction may be critical to the determina-
tion regarding an implied right of action; "[t]he question whether a statute creates a 
cause of action, either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory con-
struction." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979). 
•• BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1363 (5th ed. 1979). The ibi jus maxim has a lengthy his-
tory. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); McMahon & Rodos, 
supra note 1, at 168. 
11 See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Voting Rights Act); Wyan-
dotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Wreck Removal Acts). 
18 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a)). 
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intendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty. 19 
In addition to these decisions, Cort considered a pair of early 
Burger Court holdings. These holdings reflected a change in ju-
dicial philosophy from the broad remedial approach of the War-
ren Court, to a more stringent reading of the implication doc-
trine derived from the maxim expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius: "expression of one thing is the exclusion of others."20 In 
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of 
Railroad Passengers (Amtrak) 21 and Securities Investor Protec-
tion Corporation v. Barbour (SIPC) 22 the Court had denied im-
plied rights of action by focusing on the language and legislative 
intent, rather than remedial purpose, of the statutes. 
Cort reconciled these divergent approaches to implication of a 
private right of action. By essentially merging the relevant fac-
tors of Borak and Bankers Life with those of Amtrak and SIPC, 
Cort charted a middle course for the implication doctrine, with 
four factors to be considered explicitly: (1) whether the plaintiff 
is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted"; (2) whether there exists "any indication of legislative 
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to 
deny one"; (3) whether implication of an implied right of action 
is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative 
scheme"; and ( 4) whether the cause of action . is "traditionally 
relegated to state law . . . so that it would be inappropriate to 
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law."28 
Despite this reconciliation, the Cort test has not been uni-
formly accepted. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 24 
presented the Supreme Court's first opportunity to apply Cort. 
The majority, without mentioning Cort, reviewed the statutory 
language, the legislative history, and whether an implied cause 
of action would be "necessary to effectuate Congress' goals"26 in 
evaluating whether to imply a cause of action under section 
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. After rejecting an 
implied cause of action under this test, the majority confirmed 
its holding by applying the Cort test. 28 Although the Court de-
10 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § lO(b)). Although this decision 
actually was reached during Chief Justice Burger's tenure, the holding was essentially a 
f ait accompli, reflecting years that lower courts had recognized the right. 
•• BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979). 
11 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970). 
11 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (Securities Investor Protection Act). 
18 442 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
•• 430 U.S. 1 (1977) . 
.. Id. at 26. 
•• Id. at 37. 
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rived the same conclusion under both tests, its hesitation in ap-
plying the Cort test is puzzling. 
The Court had not discarded the Cort test, however, for it uti-
lized a full Cort analysis in Cannon u. University of Chicago. 2 7 
The majority in Cannon, including several Piper dissenters, rec-
ognized an implied right of action under Title IX. Although 
Cannon dealt with a non-securities statute, whereas Piper in-
volved a securities act, the Court has not chosen to justify its use 
of Cort in different circumstances on this basis.28 
2. The strict construction test- Shortly after Cannon, the 
Supreme Court, in Touche Ross & Co. u. Redington,29 again ad-
dressed the issue of implication in the securities field. The Court 
addressed whether Congress intended to imply a right of action 
under section l 7(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.80 
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, examined the language of 
the statute, the intent of the legislature, and the statutory 
scheme. He applied this test without clearly overruling or distin-
guishing the Cort test used in Cannon. 
Justice Rehnquist attempted to reconcile his analysis with the 
four factors of the Cort test by explaining that each Cort factor 
is not "entitled to equal weight."81 Stressing that "[t]he central 
inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create ... a pri-
vate cause of action,"82 he concluded by observing that "the first 
three factors discussed in Cort - the language and focus of the 
statute, its legislative history, and its purpose ... - are ones 
traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent. "88 
But this reconciliation is illusory. Justice Rehnquist did more 
than shift the weight of the Cort factors; he fundamentally 
altered the test. The significance of the Cort test lies not in the 
sources examined but in the manner of examination. In failing 
to focus the inquiry through the Cort factors, particularly the 
threshold inquiry of whether the statute is intended to benefit a 
specific class of plaintiffs, Justice Rehnquist embraced a wholly 
different test - the strict construction test. 
3. The present disagreement between supporters of the Cort 
17 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
•• See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 49 U.S.L.W. 4441 (U.S. April 28, 1981) (Nos. 79-
1252 & 79-1502); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
•• 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
•• 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976) (amended 1975). 
11 442 U.S. at 575. But see id. at 579-80 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 580 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) . 
.. Id. at 575. 
•• Id. at 575-76. 
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and strict construction tests- The Court's inconsistent ap-
proach to implication questions indicates a deeply rooted disa-
greement between the proponents of the Cort and strict con-
struction tests. The strict-construction-test advocates argue the 
need to limit jurisdiction of the courts by using a literal con-
struction for statutory rights of action. This approach avoids 
judicial intrusion into matters properly reserved to the legisla-
ture.3" In contrast, supporters of the Cort test advocate a flex-
ible, yet firm, approach more attuned to the compromise and 
ambiguity of legislating and more likely to achieve overriding 
statutory purposes. 311 
A recent implied rights case makes apparent the existence of 
two divergent implication tests. In Transamerica Mortgage Ad-
visors, Inc. v. Lewis,38 the Court considered whether to imply a 
private right of action enabling equitable and legal relief under 
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. 37 The majority applied the 
strict construction test of Redington, examining the language of 
the statute, its history and legislative scheme, to deny a private 
damage action while enabling an implied action for equitable re-
lief. The majority, after determining that the first two Cort f ac-
tors did not support an implied right, refused to consider further 
the remaining two factors. 38 
The treatment of Cort in Transamerica does not address the 
fundamental differences between the Cort and strict construc-
tion tests. Although both tests draw upon the same sources -
the language of the statute, the legislative intent, and the overall 
purpose and scheme - the Cort test differs in its approach to 
focussing these sources to render a conclusion. The essential 
conflict distills into whether these factors are themselves to be 
the vehicle for determining legislative intent, as Cort would sug-
gest, or whether instead these factors are merely a convenient 
guide that need not necessarily channel the inquiry into legisla-
14 Perhaps the most vocal supporter of the strict construction test is Justice Powell. 
Dissenting in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 745-46 (1979), he argued 
that the Cort test represents an impermissible judicial encroachment upon legislative 
power. 
•• The Cort test was designed "to restrict the creation of implied actions." A New 
Direction, supra note 9, at 523 n.142. But at the same time it will allow an implied right 
of action where "Congress intended to make a remedy available to a special class of 
litigants [utilizing] the four factors that Cort identifies as indicative of such intent." 
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979). 
80 444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
07 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1976). 
80 444 U.S. at 23-24. A full Cort analysis, in contrast, inquires into all four factors, 
often producing conflicting conclusions regarding implication from the various factors. 
See notes 117-19 and accompanying text infra. 
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tive intent, as the Redington court reasoned. 89 
Transamerica does provide additional support for the strict 
construction test, but this support is weakened by the Court's 
failure to confront the Cort test clearly. Transamerica, in fact, 
exemplifies the tension between the Cort test and the strict con-
struction test. 40 
This tension surfaced again in the most recent implication de-
cision, California v. Sierra Club.41 The Court, although unani-
mously opposed to implying a right of action, split regarding the 
question of the appropriate test to be employed in deciding the 
implication issue. The majority applied the Cort test, while Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in a concurrence joined by three others,42 urged 
utilization of the strict construction test. Thus Sierra Club mir-
rors Transamerica, except that it accords the Cort test majority 
status.48 
B. Analysis of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act in the 
Light of the Implication Tests. 
The recent implication cases of Cannon, Redington, Trans-
america, and Sierra Club demonstrate the viability of both the 
Cort and strict construction tests. The Supreme Court, deci-
sively divided over the issue, has failed to apply consistently one 
implication test. Furthermore, the Court has obfuscated the is-
sue by not articulating a clear distinction between the cases us-
ing different tests. One straightforward reconciliation available 
to the Court would limit Cort to non-security cases.•• This post 
•• See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 26-27 (White, J., 
dissenting) ("although subsequent decisions have indicated that the implication of a pri-
vate right of action 'is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create 
the private right of action,' ... these four factors are 'the criteria through which this 
intent could be discerned' "). 
•• The strict construction test has been applied in several other recent implication 
decisions. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); 
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). 
" 49 U.S.L.W. 4441 (U.S. April 28, 1981) (Nos. 79-1252 & 79-1502) . 
.. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice 
Powell. 
•• Two other recent Supreme Court decisions, Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Coutu, 49 U.S.L.W. 4354 (U.S. April 6, 1981) (No. 78-1945); and Northwest Airlines, Inc. 
v. Transportation Workers Union, 49 U.S.L.W. 4383 (U.S. April 20, 1981) (No. 79-1056), 
do little to reconcile the Cort and strict construction tests. In Coutu, the Court followed 
substantially the strict construction test, although making passing reference to the Cort 
factors. In contrast, Northwest Airlines pursued a more straightforward Cort analysis, 
with heavy emphasis upon the Cort threshold inquiry. 
•• Compare Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (5th Amendment), and Cannon v. 
Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (Education Amendments of 1972), and Cort v. 
'.1 
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hoc explanation would be supportable by the unique status and 
policy considerations of the securities laws. While this may be a 
valid, albeit unarticulated, rationale, it has yet to be adopted. 
In contrast, the Court's attempted reconciliation of the Cort 
and strict construction tests in Redington is unsuccessful.46 One 
basic difference between the two tests turns on the threshold in-
quiry of Cort, which focuses the implication question upon 
whether the plaintiff is of the class "especial[ly] benefit[ed]" by 
the statute.•6 Although the two tests consider the same substan-
tive material, the strict construction test's rejection of the 
threshold inquiry" creates a fundamental difference between the 
two tests. In order to clarify the area, the Court should address 
this difference directly by consistently applying and developing 
one of the tests. Until this clarification occurs, however, the un-
certainty regarding which test governs the implication of a cause 
of action under section 17(a) necessitates that both the strict 
construction and Cort tests be examined. 
1. Applying the strict construction test- Deciding whether a 
private right of action may be implied under the strict construc-
tion test of Transamerica and Redington requires evaluation of 
three factors: (1) the language of the statute; (2) the intent of 
Congress as evidenced by the legislative history; and (3) the 
statutory scheme. 
a. Statutory language- Section 17(a) on its face seems not to 
satisfy the first factor of the strict construction test, for the stat-
utory language does not suggest a private cause of action. The 
statute represents a general interdict of fraudulent practices; 
only subsequent provisions enable equitable and criminal causes 
of action.0 This does not foreclose, however, all possibility of 
discovering an implied right of action in the language of the Act. 
A private right of action for rescission of an illegal contract 
could plausibly be derived from the jurisdictional provision° 
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (Federal Campaign Act of 1971), with Transamerica Mortgage 
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (Investment Advisors Act of 1940), and 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 
17(a)). 
•• See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra. 
•• Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see text accompanying note 23 supra. 
47 See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra. 
•• Securities Act of 1933, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1976) (injunctions and prosecution of 
offenses); Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976) (penalties). 
•• Securities Act of 1933, § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1976) (district courts shall have juris-
diction "of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty 
created by this title"); see Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 878-79 (1949) (using 
Securities Act of 1933, § 22, as a basis for finding a private right of action under§ 17(a)); 
cf. H. SOWARDS, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT § 10.01(1), at 10-10 (11 BUSINESS ORGANI-
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and the provision retaining all previous suits in law or equity.110 
An analogy to the holding of Transamerica, 61 however, under-
cuts this possibility. The Court there allowed an action for re-
scission because the statutory provision under scrutiny expressly 
classified as void a contract in violation of the Act.112 In contrast, 
the Securities Act does not contain this type of express lan-
guage; the action for rescission, premised only on general con-
tract principles, 113 would not likely fall within the Transamerica 
reasoning. Thus, a strict reading of the Securities Act's language 
does not support a private right of action, and one should not be 
implied under the expressio umus maxim of statutory 
construction. 
b. Congressional intent- Despite this finding regarding the 
statutory language, settled rules of construction "could yield, of 
course, to persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent."114 
Examination of the legislative intent in this case, however, only 
buttresses the conclusion drawn from the language of the stat-
ute. Nothing in the legislative history of the Securities Act sup-
ports the assertion that Congress intended to create a private 
right of action under section 17(a). Congressional discussion of 
civil liability under the Securities Act centered on sections 11 
and 12.1111 The legislative discussions of section 17(a) made no 
mention of a private right of action,58 as reflected in the original 
ZATIONS 1980) (jurisdictional provisions of the Securities Exchange Act form a basis for a 
private right of action under rule lOb-5). 
•• Securities Act of 1933, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1976)." 
01 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
•• The Court reasoned: "By declaring certain contracts void, § 215 by its terms neces-
sarily contemplates that the issue of voidness under its criteria may be litigated some-
where." Id. at 18. 
•• General contract principles hold an illegal contract to be void. RESTATEMENT OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 598, 607 (1933). It could be argued that this gives a private litigant a right 
of action for rescission. See, e.g., Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 
43 YALE L.J. 171, 182 n.42 (1933). 
04 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979) . 
•• See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar comp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The House Committee Report summarizing the measure for the 
full House stated: "Sections 11 and 12 create and define the civil liabilities imposed by 
the act .... " Later it discussed the need to place the burden of proof on the issuer and 
said: "To impose a greater responsibility would unnecessarily restrain the conscientious 
administration of honest business with no compensating advantage to the public." H.R. 
REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933). But see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 
401 F.2d 833, 867 (1968) (Friendly, J., concurring) . 
.. See, e.g., Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H.R. 4314 before the House Comm. 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) [hereinafter cited as 
Hearings on H.R. 4314]; Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 before the Senate Banking 
and Currency Comm., 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). 
In addition, the commentators at the time were in accord that civil liability arose only 
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draft of the House measure, which implies that a right of action 
was meant only for the government.117 In fact, the drafters 
modeled section 17(a) after state Blue Sky fraud provisions, par-
ticularly the Martin Act of New York,118 which did not have a 
private cause of action.119 Furthermore, the iegislative history 
surrounding the 1954 Securities Act amendment does not men-
tion any private cause of action under section 17(a).60 
c. Statutory scheme- Following consideration of the test's 
first two elements, whatever doubt remains regarding implica-
tion of a private right of action for section 17(a) under the strict 
construction test dissipates upon examination of the statutory 
scheme. The Securities Act of 1933 has two primary goals: (1) to 
provide full and fair disclosure of material information about se-
curities being initially issued, and (2) to prohibit generally fraud 
and misrepresentation in the sale of securities.61 Section 562 con-
tains the substantive disclosure requirements, with noncompli-
ance or faulty compliance resulting in civil liability under sec-
tion 12(1)63 and section lt.11• In addition to these disclosure 
under §§ 11 and 12. See, e.g., Douglas & Bates, supra note 53; Shulman, Civil Liability 
and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933); Note, 33 CoLUM. L. REV. 1220 (1933). 
More recent commentators have concurred. See, e.g., 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 
1785-86 (2d ed. 1961); H. SOWARDS, supra note 49, at§ 10.01(1]; Horton, Section 17(a) of 
the 1933 Securities Act - The Wrong Place for a Private Right, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 44 
(1973). 
01 See Federal Securities Act, H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1933). 
08 Five states had antifraud statutes at the time: New York, New Jersey, Maryland, 
Delaware, and Connecticut. Hearings on H.R. 4314, supra note 56, at 166. The Martin 
Act of New York, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-53 (McKinney 1968), became the model 
for § 17(a). Hearings on H.R. 4314, supra note 56, at 109. 
•• Compare People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926) (Mar-
tin Act), with Seneca Wire Co. v. Leach, Inc., 247 N.Y. 1, 159 N.E. 700 (1928) (common 
law fraud). A private damage action under § 352-c of the Martin Act was not allowed 
until Barnes v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 69 Misc. 2d 1068, 332 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Spec. 
Term 1972). 
•• 1954 Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 83-577, § 10, 68 Stat. 
686; see H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & 
An. NEWS 2973, 2999. 
An implied right of action had been allowed prior to the enactment of the amend-
ments, in Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The congressional silence 
in the face of this precedent might be taken as an endorsement of implied private ac-
tions under § 17(a). Compare Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 55 n.4 
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional awareness of implied rights of 
action would constitute an endorsement of the implied rights), with Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 33 n.9 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (urging 
that congressional intent at the time of the original statutory enactment be controlling). 
•
1 See R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH, supra note 6, at 30. 
•• Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976) (pro~ibitions relating to interstate 
commerce and the mails). 
•• Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976) (civil liabilities arising in connec-
tion with prospectuses and communications); see R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH, supra note 6, 
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requirements, section 12(2) provides a private right of action to 
any purchaser of a security, against a seller that has made a ma-
terial misstatement or omission regarding any exempted or non-
exempted security.611 Another substantive antifraud provision, 
section 17(a), also forbids fraudulent or manipulative practices.66 
In contrast to section 12(2), however, section 17(a) makes no ex-
press allowance for a private cause of action. 
The express private remedies for the Securities Act have dis-
tinctly drawn boundaries. Section 11 imposes liability only on 
designated persons for faulty compliance with the registration 
requirement, does not cover exempted securities, and limits re-
covery to the purchase price.67 Section 12(1) applies solely to the 
registration and prospectus requirements of section 5.68 Like-
wise, section 12(2) covers a narrow type of activity - untrue 
statements of material facts or omissions thereof in the off er or 
sale of a security.69 Section 12 is further limited by a require-
ment of purchaser-seller privity and restricted to a remedy of 
rescission or, if the purchaser no longer owns the security, dam-
ages. 70 Sections 11 and 12 also are subject to an explicit statute 
of limitations. 71 
Although sections 17(a), 11, and 12 overlap somewhat, section 
17(a) spans more broadly sections 11 and 12, considered either 
singly or combined. Section 17(a), unlike sections 11 and 12(1), 
covers exempted securities, and may be invoked against any vio-
lation occurring "in the offer or sale"72 of a security, in contrast 
to sections 11 and 12, which apply to only narrow aspects of a 
securities distribution. Additionally, section 17(a) has no privity 
requirements or limits on damages, and the Act makes no spe-
at 839. 
04 Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976) (civil liabilities on account of 
false registration statement); see R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH, supra note 6, at 825-35. See 
also 3 L. Loss, supra note 56, at 1784-85. 
116 Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976); see R. JENNINGS & H. 
MARSH, supra note 6, at 840-41. 
"" Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976) (fraudulent interstate 
transactions). 
81 In contrast to § 12(2), there is no need for contractual privity under § 11. The re-
covery is limited to a difference money formula (price paid, not exceeding the offering 
price, compared with the stock value at the time of suit or when previously sold). See R. 
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 6, at 833 . 
... ~~-~ \ 
•• Id. at 840-41. 
10 Id. The privity requirement has been diminished by various theories. See generally 
H. SowARDs, supra note 49, at §§ 9.03[1) & 9.04[4]. 
71 Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976). 
11 United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 772 (1979). 
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cific provision for a statute of limitations under section 17(a).73 
The statutory scheme makes apparent that Congress consid-
ered and implemented strict requirements for civil liability 
under sections 11 and 12. A private right of action under section 
17(a) would substantially overlap sections 11 and 12. Congress 
did not, however, place restrictions similar to sections 11 and 12 
on section 17(a), so that an implied right of action under section 
17(a) would tend to undermine the express requirements of sec-
tions 11 and 12. Therefore, the third element of the strict con-
struction test also weighs against implication of a private right 
of action for section 17(a)." , 
The tripartite strict construction test does not support an im-
plied right of action under Securities Act section 17(a). Neither 
the language of the Act, nor the legislative history, nor the inter-
relationship of the Act's provisions favor an implied right. 
2. An implied right of action under the Cort test- The po-
tential viability of the Cort test mandates that the inquiry into 
an implied right of action under section 17(a) include considera-
tion of the Cort factors. 
a. Statutory intent to benefit a specific class- In assessing 
whether the Cort test enables an implied right of action under 
section 17(a), the threshold question "is whether the statute was 
enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is 
a member."711 In determining whether the plaintiff stands within 
the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, the Court 
observed that where an implied right has been found "there has 
generally been a clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff, 
, or a pervasive legislative scheme governing" the defendant and 
plaintiff classes. 76 
The Court in Cannon examined the implication cases thor-
oughly and reached several conclusions regarding the type of 
statute satisfying the threshold inquiry. The Court found that, 
with few exceptions, implied rights of action have been granted 
1
• See H. SOWARDS, supra note 49, at§ 10.06. 
74 Several recent lower court decisions have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., 
McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Freeman v. McCor-
mack, 490 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburg, 
Kan., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980); Martin v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, 
Friedricks, Inc., (1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 'II 97,586 (E.D. La. 
1980). 
1
• Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979). 
1
• Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975); see California v. Sierra Club, 49 U.S.L.W. 4441, 
4444 (U.S. April 28, 1981) (Nos. 79-1252 & 79-1502) ("The question is not simply who 
would benefit from the Act, but whether Congress intended to confer federal rights upon 
those beneficiaries."). 
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"where the language of the statute explicitly conferred a right 
directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in the 
case."77 "Conversely, the Court has been especially reluctant to 
imply causes of actions under statutes that create duties on the 
part of persons for the benefit of the public at large. "78 This 
serves to separate those statutes protecting the general public 
from those embodying a narrower protective intent.79 
The threshold Cort inquiry for section 17(a), requiring there 
to be a sufficiently identified plaintiff class in order to imply a 
private right of action, appears satisfied only by subsection 
17(a)(3). Subsection 17(a)(3), which forbids the perpetration of 
fraud or deceit "upon the purchaser,"80 sufficiently identifies a 
group to be protected by the statute. 81 If this group, however, 
represents the sole plaintiff class sufficiently identified within 
the meaning of Cort, the reach of an implied right of action 
under section 17(a) will be limited substantially. 
A second potential identified class which might satisfy the 
Cort threshold requirement, and significantly expand the poten-
tial scope of implied causes of action for section 17(a) under the 
Cort test, would be participants in a selling transaction who are 
harmed by the offeror or seller. Section 17(a) has been read to 
apply to the "entire selling process."82 Yet the group of market 
participants who will receive protection under section 17(a) are 
defined by the violation; they are not a clearly identified class, in 
contrast to purchasers, until the violation occurs. Hence, this 
group is no more clearly identified than the general public,88 and 
77 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979). Alternatively, a 
statute might be found to protect a special class, not where the statute confers a right, 
but where the statute instructs that a particular group is not to be harmed. For example, 
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § SOb-15 (1976), at issue in Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), was written explicitly to 
prevent the perpretration of certain acts upon "clients." 
•• Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13. 
•• See id.; California v. Siena Club, 49 U.S.L.W. 4441, 4443 (U.S. April 28, 1981) (Nos. 
79-1252 & 79-1502) (statute at issue "states no more than a general proscription of cer-
tain activities [and] does not unmistakably focus on any particular class of 
beneficiaries"). 
80 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). 
81 See Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275 (D. Alaska 1979); cf. Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 27 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that "clients" under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 are a sufficiently iden-
tified class to satisfy the Cort threshold inquiry). 
81 In United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 769 (1979), defendant argued that§ 17(a)'s 
reference to "the offer and sale" limited its application to investors. The Court rejected 
this contention and found that§ 17(a) applied to the "entire selling process," id. at 772-
74, malting reference to the congressional intent that all who fall prey to fraudulent prac-
tices were meant to be included. Id. at 775. 
81 When a statute means to protect only the general public, it fails to "explicitly [con-
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cannot satisfy the Cort threshold inquiry. If Cort enables an im-
plied cause of action, it must therefore be limited to purchasers 
under subsection 17(a)(3)." 
b. Legislative intent to deny a private cause of action- The 
second Cort factor asks whether "any indication of legislative in-
tent, explicit or implicit, [exists] either to create such a remedy 
or to deny one. "80 Although legislative intent to create a private 
cause of action need not be shown where the class of plaintiffs 
clearly is granted certain rights, "an explicit purpose to deny 
such cause of action would be controlling. "88 
The legislative history of the Securities Act suggests that Con-
gress paid scant attention, either pro or con, to the existence of a 
private right of action. No "explicit purpose" to bar a private 
action may be discerned in the legislative history.87 Perhaps the 
congressional intent to deny a private right of action may be in-
f erred from the existence of civil liabilities under sections 11 and 
12 of the Act, which arguably preclude any additional causes of 
action. 88 This conjectural argument, however, rests upon the ex-
pressio unius maxim rejected in Cort. 89 Without a more explicit 
showing of contrary congressional intent, the second prong of 
the Cort test will not bar implication of a cause of action under 
section 17(a). 
c. Necessity of an implied right of action for effectuating the 
statutory scheme- The third Cort factor to be considered is 
whether implication of a private right of action is "consistent 
fer] a right directly on a class of persons .... " Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 
U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979). See California v. Sierra Club, 49 U.S.L.W. 4441, 4443 (U.S. 
April 28, 1981) (Nos. 79-1252 & 79-1502) (It would make meaningless the "especial" ben-
efit factor if "a victim of any crime would be deemed an especial beneficiary of the crimi-
nal statute's proscription."). 
84 See Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275 (D. Alaska 1979). 
"" Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) . 
.. Id. at 82. In fact, the Transamerica dissent restated the inquiry as being "whether 
there is evidence of an expression of implicit legislative intent to negate the claimed 
private right of action." 444 U.S. at 28. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 
677, 694 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 82. 
87 See notes 54-60 and accompanying text supra. 
"" See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (1968) (Friendly, J., concur-
ring); 3 L. Loss, supra note 56, at 1785. Loss argues that Congress, given the integrated 
statutory scheme created under §§ 5, 6, 11, and 12 of the Securities Act, could not have 
intended for§ 17(a) to run roughshod over the explicit statutory provisions. Id. at 1785. 
But see Horton, supra note 56, at 58 (Loss' analysis "is simply too sophisticated to be 
persuasive"). Loss himself has acknowledged that "the existence of a private right of 
action under§ 17(a) seems to be taken for granted." 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 
3913 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). 
0 422 U.S. at 82 n.14. See also California v. Sierra Club, 49 U.S.L.W. 4441, 4443 n.6 
(U.S. April 28, 1981) (Nos. 79-1252 & 79-1502); SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 
344, 350 (1934). 
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with the underlying purposes of the legislative ·scheme. "90 
Cannon reformulated this third prong, noting the Court's recep-
tivity to implication when "necessary or at least helpful to the 
accomplishment of the statutory purpose .... '191 With the 
question framed in this fashion, an implied right of action would 
likely be found incompatible with the legislative scheme only 
when in direct conflict with an express statutory provision. 
An implied right of action under section.17(a) is not dearly 
"necessary or at least helpful" to achieving the statutory pur-
pose. Extending section 17(a) liability would further the legisla-
tive purpose to eliminate securities fraud only so long as it did 
not infringe upon sections 11 and 12. But this raises two issues: 
first, whether a private right of action for section 17(a) is "neces-
sary or helpful," given the express remedies of sections 11 and 
12 in addition to rule l0b-5; second, whether implication of a 
cause of action is counterproductive, given the strict require-
ments of sections 11 and 12. 
Section 17(a) covers a broader range of acts than do the ex-
press provisions of sections 11 and 12.es Unless a private remedy 
under section 17(a) undermines the express provisions of sec-
tions 11 and 12, the additional antifraud liability afforded by 
such private actions would be beneficial, advancing a basic pur-
pose of the Securities Act.98 This is true, however, only to the 
extent that private actions under section 17(a) do not overlap 
with rule l0b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act.94 If rule lOb-5 
already provides the additional enforcement to be provided by 
section 17(a), implication under section 17(a) would be superflu-
ous to the statutory scheme.911 In fact, section 17(a), although 
more limited in scope, has less stringent requirements than rule 
lOb-5.96 Therefore, section 17(a) would extend fraud liability be-
80 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78. The inquiry will not proceed to the third factor unless 
one of the first two Cort factors would support an implied right of action. See California 
v. Sierra Club, 49 U.S.L.W. 4441, 4444 (U.S. April 28, 1981) (Nos. 79-1252 & 79-1502). 
" Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979). 
.. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra. 
•• A primary purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors, United States v. · 
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774-76 (1979), and any method of achieving that purpose should 
be favored unless counterbalanced by negative side effects. See also J.I. Case v. Borak, 
377 U.S. 426, 431-35 (1963) (remedial purpose supported implication) . 
.. Rule lOb-5 was drafted to provide a device for avoiding§ 17(a)'s nonapplicability to 
fraud by a purchaser. See H. SowARDs, supra note 49, § 10.01(1), at 10-4. 
•• See Leonard v. Drug Fair, Inc., (1979-1180 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) 11 97,144 (D.D.C. 1979); H. SOWARDS, supra note 49, at§ 10.01(1) . 
.. On their face, rule l0b-5 and§ 17(a) have several differences. First, rule l0b-5 ap-
plies to any "purchase or sale" of a security, while the scope of§ 17(a) is limited to "the 
offer or sale" of a security. Although this phrasing of § 17(a) is "expansive enough to 
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yond that presently existing under rule lOb-5. 
Even though the right of action for section 17(a) would ad-
vance a statutory purpose, private actions under section 17(a) 
might still detract from the overriding congressional desire to fa-
cilitate capital formation. Congress enacted exacting require-
ments for sections ·11 and 1297 to limit the scope of liability. A 
major concern of the security market participants, upon enact-
ment of the statute, was that crushing civil liability would crip-
ple capital markets.98 This concern caused Congress to circum-
scribe carefully the liability sections of the Securities Act. 
Courts did not expand private remedies under the securities 
statutes until years after passage of the Act.99 This trend 
culminated in 1971 with the recognition of an implied right of 
action for rule lOb-5.100 The trend during the last decade, how-
ever, has been to limit the application of the securities laws in 
general. The Supreme Court has commented, in fact, upon the 
counterproductivity of additional securities liability.101 
To suppose that the Court would narrow the scope of private 
causes of action under rule lOb-5, while expanding private ac-
tions under section 17(a), is not necessarily anomalous. 101 Sec-
tion 17(a) is a more narrowly drawn provision than rule l0b-5.108 
Furthermore, section 17(a) is the work of Congress, unlike rule 
cover the entire selling process," United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773 (1978), it 
cannot be used to remedy fraud by a purchaser. H. Sow ARDS, supra note 49, § 10.01(1), 
at 10-4. Second, rule l0b-5 incorporated § l0(b)'s wording of "manipulative or deceptive 
devices"; § 17(a) contains no such phrasing. Finally, while rule lOb-5 is an exclusively 
federal cause of action,§ 17(a) can be asserted in state court under the dual jurisdiction 
provision of the Securities Act. 
Although § 17(a) is not limited to the original issuance of a security, rule l0b-5 is 
the more frequently chosen litigation vehicle, due to its broader scope and more certain 
private right of action. Consequently, rule 10b-5's bounds have been more clearly defined 
by adjudication. 
"" See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Seas. 9-10 (1933). 
08 See id. at 2, 5; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 753-54 
(1975). 
" See, e.g., Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (§ 17(a)); Kardon v. 
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
100 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
1
•
1 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980); Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 753-54 (1975). 
1 
.. See Aaron v. SEC, 466 U.S. 680 (1980); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 
(1979). Perhaps the best explanation for this expansive holding in contrast to the nar-
rowing of rule l0b-5 is found in the Court's reasoning that "[p)lacing brokers outside the 
aegis of § l 7(a) would create a loophoie in the statute that Congress simply did not 
intend to create." Id. at 777. This approach, as one commentator suggested, "is sound 
and firmly rooted in the reality of the operations of the securities markets." Steinberg, 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GBO. L.J. 
163, 170 (1979). 
103 See note 96 and accompanying text supra. 
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lOb-5, which was promulgated by the Securities Exchange Com-
mission. Thus there may be logical consistency in the Court's 
expanding liability under section 17(a) while simultaneously re-
stricting it under lOb-5. 
Nonetheless, the conclusion as to whether an implied right of 
action under section 17(a) advances the statutory scheme re-
mains unclear. The chilling effects upon capital formulation, and 
the potential undermining of the express liability provisions of 
sections 11 and 12, cannot be ignored. The appropriate response, 
adopted by several lower courts, is to dovetail section 17(a) with 
sections 11 and 12, construing separately the subsections of 
17(a) to enable an implied right of action for any subsection not 
overlapping substantially with sections 11 and 12. 104 
This approach has led to implication of private causes of ac-
tion under both sections 17(a)(l) and 17(a)(3). SEC injunctions 
under 17(a)(l) require scienter; extending this scienter require-
ment to embrace private damage actions would create a higher 
standard of culpability than necessary for liability under sec-
tions 11 and 12,1°11 thereby avoiding overlap with these sec-
tions.106 Similarly, implication of a private right of action under 
section 17(a)(3) will not overlap with the express provisions of 
sections 11 and 12 because section 17(a)(3) addresses itself to 
different concerns than sections 11 and 12.107 
d. Within traditional state sphere- Cort rejects implication 
of a private cause of action for matters traditionally relegated to 
state courts. Liability for the sorts of transactions arising under 
1°' See Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275 (D. Alaska 1979) (implied right 
of action under § 17(a)(3), but not under § 17(a)(l) and (2)); Dorfman v. First Boston 
Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (implied private right of action for fraud under 
§ 17(a)(l) and (3), but actions under § 17(a)(2) are subject to§ 12 limitations). 
100 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). The assumption that the scienter requirement 
for SEC-injunctive actions would extend to private damage actions receives support from 
the pattern followed by the Supreme Court in the development of rule l0b-5. See Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (private damage action); Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (criminal action). 
108 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976); Demoe v. Dean Witter 
& Co., 476 F. Supp. 275, 280 (D. Alaska 1979). 
107 This point never was reached by the two decisions enabling an implied right of 
action under § 17(a)(3). See Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275 (D. Alaska 
1979); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Those decisions 
- decided before Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), rejected the scienter requirement 
in§ 17(a)(3) actions - assumed a § 17(a)(3) scienter requirement and thus did not con-
front the question of whether the statutory language of § 17(a)(3) was sufficiently dis-
tinct from §§ 11 and 12 to dispel concerns that a private right of action under § 17(a)(3) 
would overlap with §§ 11 and 12. 
The conclusion that § 17(a)(3) addresses different matters than §§ 11 and 12 draws 
support from Aaron. The Court described § 17(a)(3) as dealing with effects, whereas § 
17(a)(2), and by implication § 12(2), concerns itself with conduct. Id. at 696-97. 
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section 17(a), however, is not such a matter. The congressional 
hearings regarding enactment of the Securities Act are replete 
with.testimony regarding the states' inability to deal with securi-
ties fraud. 108 In addition, the Securities Act confers concurrent 
jurisdiction upon federal and state courts, 109 providing strong 
support for the proposition that section 17(a) matters are not 
solely within the state sphere. 
The foregoing four-factor analysis demonstrates that Cort 
would enable an implied private right of action under section 
17(a). The most vexing question is whether an implied action 
under section 17(a) would detract from the statutory scheme by 
overlapping with the explicit provisions of sections 11 and 12. 
This difficulty may be resolved if private . actions are implied 
only under sections 17(a)(l) and 17(a)(3), which do not impinge 
unduly upon sections 11 and 12. A further requirement, imposed 
by the Cort threshold inquiry, is that implied actions be limited 
to statutes enacted for the special benefit of a specific class of 
plaintiffs. Section 17(a)(3) satisfies this threshold requirement, 
in addition to avoiding problems of overlap with sections 11 and 
12. Thus an implied right of action will be available, applying 
the Cort test, under section 17(a)(3). 
II. A STATUTORY ALTERNATIVE· 
A. The Need for a Statutory Solution 
The Supreme Court speaks explicitly of the need for a statu-
tory solution to the implication question. In Cannon, the Court 
addressed itself directly to the legislature: "When Congress in-
tends private litigants to have a cause of action to support their 
statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much 
when it creates those rights. "110 Justice Rehnquist, concurring in 
Cannon, agreed with the majority although going one step fur-
ther, stating that "this Court in the future should be extremely 
reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on 
the part of the Legislative Branch. "111 
The call for a legislative solution derives considerable support 
108 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 4314, supra note 56, at 10, 99; S. REP. No. 47, 73d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 55. 
109 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976). 
110 441 U.S. at 717. 
111 Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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from the Supreme Court's uncertainty in the area. The leading 
decisions demonstrate the shifting nature of implication doc-
trine. The Court has employed the Cort test in Cannon and Si-
erra Club, while utilizing the strict construction test in Reding-
ton and Transamerica. mi 
The inadequacy of both the Cort and strict construction tests 
favors a statutory resolution. The strict construction test is 
flawed by its reliance upon statutory language to determine con-
gressional intent. Such reliance casts implication in a disfavored 
light; searching for the justification for an implied right in an 
express provision may, to some extent, be assuming the answer 
in the question. This does not represent an evenhanded ap-
proach to the implication question. 113 Moreover, the strict con-
struction test's emphasis upon manifest legislative intent ap-
pears to ignore the compromise and ambiguity inherent in much 
legislation.1a Courts frequently must act to determine the 
proper scope of ambiguous legislation. 1111 Recognition of legisla-
tion's inherent ambiguity appears especially appropriate in the 
securities field, where exhaustive specification of express liabili-
ties would be both difficult and unwieldy.116 
The Cort test presents several problems as well. The test pro-
vides little guidance for balancing inconsistent factors. As the 
Cannon Court observed, typically the four Cort factors will not 
all support an implied right of action.117 Because implication 
still may be granted even when all four factors do not support 
an implied right, a balancing problem results in applying the 
111 See pt. I A supra. 
m The contradictory conclusions reached in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), regarding an implied right of action demonstrate that the 
orientation of the approach. can determine the outcome. While the majority insisted 
upon "persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent," id. at 20, when the statute 
failed to provide expressly a private cause of action, the dissent would require instead 
"explicit purpose to deny such cause of action." Id. at 28, quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 
66, 82 (1975). 
"' See Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE 
DAME LAw. 33, 41 (1979) ("Legislation is often ambiguous, not because ambiguity is de-
sirable, but because compromise, with the attendant loss of clarity, is required for pas-
sage of the legislation."). See generally J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 15, at ,r 48.02. 
m See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring) (Congress has "tended to rely [upon] the courts to decide whether there should 
be a private right of action, rather than determining the question for itself."). 
"' See ALI FED. SEC. CODE§ 1722(a), Comment (3) (1978); 2 P. ANISMAN, PROPOSALS 
FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW FOR CANADA § 13.16, at 273 (1979). 
117 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). The Court has sug-
gested, however, that implication cannot occur unless at least one of the first two Cort 
factors supports an implied action. See California v. Sierra Club, 49 U.S.L.W. 4441, 4444 
(U.S. April 28, 1981) (Nos. 79-1252 & 79-1502). 
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test. 118 Exacerbating the difficulty is Cort's description of the 
test elements as merely "relevant factors."119 This creates ambi-
guity which could be eliminated if the test were a step-by-step 
analysis, 120 with each step a prerequisite to the next.121 Further-
more, the Cort test allows and perhaps encourages congressional 
laxity in drafting. This laxity enables judicial legislating - and 
to such an extent that Justice Powell, at least, has called for 
abandonment of the Cort test to avert "political default by 
Congress. "122 
B. Alternative Legislative Solutions 
Two critical parameters are involved in determining the de-
sired form for a legislative solution to this dissatisfaction with 
the strict construction and Cort tests. First, the solution should 
be a comprehensive, rather than piecemeal, approach to implica-
tion questions in the securities field. The recent rash of implica-
tion cases128 demonstrates the potential scope of implied private 
rights of action in the securities field. Rather than undertaking 
the burdensome task of piecemeal consideration of prior enact-
ments, 1 2-& Congress should endorse a private remedy for all se-
curities statutes. Not only would a comprehensive statute place 
less burden on Congress, but it would also diminish the chance 
of inconsistent enactments or forgotten provisions. 
Second, the comprehensive solution should be quasi-express. 
A quasi-express solution is a policy statement favoring implica-
tion, providing guidelines for the courts to decide when a right 
of action will be implied.1211 The quasi-express remedy differs 
primarily from an express remedy in its flexibility of application. 
118 See, e.g., A New Direction, supra note 9, at 508-09 & nn.26-27. 
11
• Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
110 This may enable courts to manipulate the factors. See A New Direction, supra 
note 9, at 508 & n.25. 
m See id. at 524 (suggesting that the implication test would be strengthened by re-
quiring satisfaction of Cort's threshold inquiry). 
m Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
See id. at 740-47 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport 
Workers Union, 49 U.S.L.W. 4383, 4388 (U.S. April 20, 1981) (No. 79-1056). 
'" See note 2 supra. 
, .. See Steinberg, supra note 114, at 51; SEC's Investment Adviser Proposals Criti-
cized, 877 FED. SEC. L. REPORTS 4, 5 (1980) (The Investment Company Institute believes 
that a possible amendment to the Investment Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l, (1976), 
"to permit private suits for damages should not be made in isolation. Instead it should 
be part of a broader consideration of private rights of action under the federal securities 
laws."). 
na See ALI FED. SEc. CODE § l 722(a), Comment 3 (1978). 
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The ultimate decision regarding any particular implied right of 
action is left, to some extent, with the courts.128 The quasi-ex-
press approach avoids the piecemeal consideration of implied 
rights of action that an express approach would necessitate, 
while still providing a greater measure of certainty and a more 
clear definition of congressional policy than are available under 
the Cort and strict construction tests. 
C. The ALI Proposal 
Proposed ALI Federal Securities Code section l 722(a)117 rep-
resents one such quasi-express legislative solution. Implication 
of a cause of action under the ALI proposal occurs upon satisfac-
tion of four prerequisites. The plaintiff can then seek a right of 
action under a substantive provision, provided the substantive 
elements are met. Proposed section 1722(a) blends factual pre-
conditions - directing the court to consider several factual ele-
ments, including "the nature of the defendant's conduct, the de-
gree of his culpability, the injury suffered ... and the deterrent 
eff ect"128 - together with the Cort and strict construction tests. 
The influence of the strict construction test is apparent in the 
ALI test's first condition, limiting implication where inconsistent 
with express provisions. The Cort threshold inquiry surfaces in 
the second condition of the ALI test, requiring that implication 
occur under a provision "designed for the special benefit of a 
class of persons." The last two parts of section 1722(a) empha-
size the factual focus of the test. The third condition mandates 
that "under the circumstances" the remedy not be "disportion-
ate" to the violation, while the fourth condition sets a ceiling 
upon damages. Section 1722(a) thus creates a hurdle to be over-
come before the underlying substantive provision can be ad-
, .. See id. (judicial development of implied rights of action "as essential as it is 
unavoidable"). -
'"' Id. § 1722(a) provides: 
A court, considering the nature of the defendant's conduct, the degree of his 
culpability, the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and the deterrent effect of recog-
nizing a private action may recognize [a private] action even though it is not 
expreBBly created . . . but only if (1) the action is not inconsistent with the con-
ditions or restrictions in any of the actions expreBBly created or with the scheme 
of this [statute], (2) the provision, rule, or order that is the basis of the action is 
designed for the special benefit of a class of persons to which the plaintiff be-
longs against the kind of harm alleged, (3) the plaintiff satisfies the court that 
under the circumstances the type of remedy sought is not disproportionate to 
the alleged violation, and (4) in cases comparable to those [that expreBBly spec-
ify] a maximum measure of damages, a comparable maximum is imposed. 
, .. Id. 
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dressed.129 Thus, "satisfaction even of all four criteria" will not 
necessarily ensure recognition of a private right of action. 180 
The ALI test represents a substantial improvement over the 
Cort and strict construction tests.181 The factual elements of the 
ALI test focus judicial attention in a consistent manner and also 
enable rejection of spurious suits.182 The ALI test, by adopting a 
more even-handed approach to implication questions, eliminates 
the undue restrictiveness of the strict construction test.188 The 
rigidity of the strict construction test may well have resulted 
from the difficulty encountered by the courts in restricting im-
plied causes of action to deserving plaintiffs, once an implied 
right had been established.184 The ALI test, with its factual pre-
requisites, substantially solves this difficulty. 
In addition, the ALI test would provide greater certainty for 
those potentially liable under the securities laws. Under the Cort 
and strict construction tests, implication is merely the first ques-
tion addressed by the court. A host of collateral questions then 
are necessary to define the limits of the cause of action.18& With-
119 In contrast to the Cort test, under which all four factors typically will not agree, 
see notes 117-21 and accompanying text supra, the ALI test requires satisfaction of all 
four elements in order to imply a cause of action. 
180 ALI FEo. SEC. CooE § 1722(a), Comment 4 (1978). 
181 See Troop, supra note 11, at 1610 (§ 1722(a) "goes far to resolve the uncertainties 
of implied liability"). But see Lowenfels, supra note 11, at 660 (§ 1722(a) will "engender 
more problems than it will'resolve in attempting to provide standards for the judicial 
implication of further liabilities"). 
181 The facility to reject spurious claims on a factual basis, thereby conserving scarce 
judicial resources, may be § 1722(a)'s best attribute. Cf. A New Direction, supra not.e 9, 
at 523 n.142 (Section 1722(a) is "designed, like the Cort criteria, to restrict the creation 
of implied actions."). . 
,aa A major deficiency of the strict construction t.est is its stringency and inflexibility. 
It is doubtful whether the strict construction test would ever enable an implied right of 
action, excepting the type of action at stake in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (rescission). The lower courts have been quick to deny privat.e 
rights of action under the strict construction t.est. See not.e 74 supra. This has produced 
anomalous limitations upon implied causes of action. For example, in Gateway Indus. v. 
Agency Rent A Car, 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ill. 1980), a private injunctive action under 
the Williams Act, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976), was denied to a t.ender offer target 
company suing for injunctive relief on behalf of its shareholders. Although "the deci-
sional authority unanimously upheld the existence of a privat.e right of action for injunc-
tive relief under§ 13(d)," 495 F. Supp. at 95, the court, using the strict construction test, 
decided to the contrary and denied the right of action. 
'" For instance, the Supreme Court has struggled to narrow implied privat.e damage 
actions under rule lOb-5, though a series of decisions restricting the scope of the prima 
facie elements of a rule lOb-5 cause of action. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
••• Rule lOb-5 litigation demonstrates the extent of the collateral inquiries. Collat.eral 
questions in a rule l0b-5 action include the degree of culpability, who can sue or be sued, 
reliance and causation, prohibitive conduct, and defenses. See generally E. GADSBY, FED-
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out careful circumscription of the action, the securities partici-
pant faces uncertainty regarding his potential liability. The un-
certainty and potential for expanded liability have a chilling 
effect upon actors in the securities industry.188 The ALI test, in 
contrast, likely will not have the same effect. The ALI test - by 
placing a ceiling on damages, 187 and by allowing the imposition 
of liability only in egregious factual circumstances188 - creates a 
higher degree of certainty for securities market participants than 
either of the present implication tests. 
The primary weakness of the ALI test is its imposition of a 
potentially heavy burden on the courts, by necessitating case-by-
case analysis. Recent concerns with the federal court workload119 
indicate the sensitivity of any proposal which might add to the 
already burgeoning federal docket. The increase occasioned by 
the ALI test, however, may be more illusory than real. Implied 
rights of action are litigated extensively under the Cort and 
strict construction tests; the new caseload would more than 
likely merely supplant the old. Furthermore, even assuming that 
the ALI test would increase the federal caseload, the burden of 
the new cases may be less than those arising under the present 
tests, because the issues are primarily factual rather than legal. 
Thus, the ALI test could reduce the workload at the appellate 
level. 
Adding the fourth Cort prong - requiring consideration of 
whether implication impinges upon an area "traditionally rele-
gated to state law" - to the ALI test would further diminish 
the likelihood of increasing federal court workloads. 140 The Su-
preme Court has gone to great lengths to stress the importance 
of maintaining federal-state cooperation, especially in the securi-
ties area. 141 This additional criterion would satisfy the Court's 
concern, while limiting the federal caseload, by relegating cer-
KRAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §§ 5.01-.04 (llA BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 1981). 
'" See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-49 (1975). 
187 See note 127 supra. · 
'" See text accompanying note 128 supra. 
119See, e.g., Bork, Dealing With the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 232-
33 (1976); Haworth & Meador, A Proposed New Federal Intermediate Appellate Court, 
12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201, 202 (1978); Lasker, The Court Crunch: A View From the 
Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245, 246-47 (1977). 
"
0 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
"' See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (termination of a shareholders derivative 
action by the disinterested directors of the corporation); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 
430 U.S. 462 (1977) (freezeout of minority shareholders under Delaware state law chal-
lenged under rule l0b-5); cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) 
(congressional power to regulate commerce is liniited by the sphere of traditional state 
sovereignty). 
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tain causes of action to a state forum. 142 Although this change 
would improve section 1722(a), its absence is not a fatal flaw. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the Supreme Court will imply a private right of ac-
tion under Securities Act section 17(a) is uncertain. The most 
recent cases indicate a marked split in the Court between the 
strict construction test of Redington and the Cort v. Ash analy-
sis. While the strict construction test would not enable an im-
plied private right of action for section 17(a), Cort would allow 
an implied private right of action under section 17(a)(3). 
The divergent results for section 17(a) under the present im-
plication tests amply demonstrate the need for legislative inter-
vention. Congress should adopt a comprehensive, quasi-express 
implication statute - perhaps mirroring proposed ALI section 
1722(a) - applying to all private causes of action arising under 
the securities statutes. 
-Steven M. Stankewicz 
"" The ALI drafters omitted the fourth Cort prong because they considered the desire 
for avoiding the needless addition of a federal action to be offset by the desire for "uni-
form federal coverage." ALI FED. SEC. CODE§ 1722(a), Comment (3) (1978) (referring to 
id., § 1721, Comment 12). 
